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FAIRNESS AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: 
THE CIVIL LAW PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION∗∗ 
   
1. Introduction 
The title of this essay is loosely modeled upon the work of Thomas M. 
Franck, an influential international law scholar preoccupied with the 
notion of fairness.2 In Franck’s writings, fairness was portrayed as a 
relative and indeterminate concept.3 At times, however, the author seemed 
to revert to a foundationalist defense of fairness as a distinctive trait of 
advanced legal systems, setting them apart from chaotic and despotic 
regimes.4 While remote from present-day European troubles, Franck’s 
oscillation captures the spirit of the time in EU legal discourse. On one 
hand, disenchantment with the EU legal project as an instrument of justice 
is on the rise.5 Trenchant critiques have been aimed at the very design of 
‘integration through law,’ which has proven structurally unable to cure 
problems in the socio-economic peripheries of the Union,6 has failed at 
creating true post-national cohesion,7 and seems founded on a false or 
framed mode of democratic deliberation.8 In the particular context of 
private law, a growing body of literature is casting doubts on the ability of 
EU-led consumer protection to correct the inequities of Europe’s markets, 
                                                          
∗ Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law and Center for the Study of Europe. 
Thanks to Marija Bartl, Bianca Gardella-Tedeschi, Steven Garza, Duncan Kennedy, 
Fernanda Nicola, and Mark Pettit for comments on earlier drafts. Errors are mine. 
∗∗ Forthcoming in S. Vogenauer and S. Weatherill Eds., General Principles of Law: 
European and Comparative Perspectives, Hart 2016. 
2 TM Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press, 
1998); TM Franck, ‘Epistemology at a Time of Perplexity’ (2002) 13 European Journal of 
International Law 1025 (defending fairness against cultural relativism). 
3 Franck, Fairness, (n 2) 14 (“[F]airness is relative and subjective . . . a human, subjective, 
contingent quality….”).  
4 See E MacDonald, International Law and Ethics after the Critical Challenge: Framing 
the Legal within the Post-Foundational (2011) 220-221 (documenting this shift in Franck’s 
writings); I Scobbie, ‘Tom Franck’s Fairness’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International 
Law 909. 
5 D Kochenov, G de Burca, and A Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Hart 
Publishing, 2014). 
6 D Kukovec, ‘Law and the Periphery’ (2014) 21 European Law Journal 406. 
7 JHH Weiler, ‘Van Gend en Loos: The Individual as Subject and Object and the Dilemma 
of European Legitimacy’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 94, 103. 
8 M Bartl, ‘Internal Market Rationality, Private Law and the Direction of the Union: 
Resuscitating the Market as the Object of the Political’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 
572. 
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especially in the aftermath of the crisis and in light of the structural 
dynamics of legal integration.9 
On the other hand, jurists seem unable to relinquish faith in fairness, or 
justice, as a plausible aspiration of the EU legal system – a guiding 
principle, procedural and discursive if not substantive, which EU law 
should, and can, uphold because the world would certainly be worse 
without it. 10 The depth of interdependence between member states, 
reached through free trade and centralized policies over the past six 
decades, has disabled a number of domestic justice mechanisms,11 with the 
result that if no justice can be found on the EU plane, all hope is lost.12  
The chasm between faith and skepticism runs deep, not only between 
various scholarly camps, but also among scholars of similar persuasion, 
and even within the body of single authors’ contributions.13  
The general principle of fairness, recently articulated by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), is bound to prompt exactly this 
sort of ambivalence among scholars. Fairness in private law could be 
dismissed as hopelessly indeterminate: yet another venue of judicial 
balancing, a technique already seen ad nauseam in Luxembourg, whereby 
lip service is paid to conflicting considerations, but no real solace can be 
found against regressive outcomes of law and policy choices.14 At the 
same time, the judicial articulation of a general principle of fairness in 
private law could be seen as a prompt for domestic courts to entertain 
context-sensitive considerations, in such a way as to redress, within the 
boundaries of judicial discretion, the predicaments of situationally 
disadvantaged parties. A Rawlsian reading of fairness would point 
precisely in this direction.15 Particularized, policy-oriented inquiries into 
the distributive stakes of each dispute, such as the relative impact upon 
low-income subjects of (in)validating certain contract terms or 
(dis)allowing certain remedies, could ultimately raise the standards of 
substantive justice in the EU.16 
                                                          
9 See D Caruso, ‘Qu’ils mangent des contrats: Rethinking Justice in EU Contract Law’ in 
D Kochenov (ed), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Hart Publishing, 2014) 367 (surveying this 
literature).  
10 See O Gerstenberg, ‘Constitutional Reasoning in Private Law: The Role of the CJEU in 
Adjudicating Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 599 
(providing a theoretical framework and a comprehensive analysis of the CJEU’s case law 
on fairness in B2C relations). 
11 A Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
12 J Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Polity, 2013). 
13 See Section 9. 
14 M Lasser, ‘Fundamentally Flawed: The CJEU’s Jurisprudence on Fundamental Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms’ (2014) 15 Theoretical Inquiries Law 229. 
15 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) 76. 
16 LA Fennell and RH McAdams, ‘The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics’ (2016) 
100 Minnesota Law Review (providing examples of distribution- sensitive judicial 
reasoning in contracts and other areas of law).  
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These pages, based on the premise that distributive analysis in private law 
adjudication is desirable, set forth the argument that the CJEU has recently 
proven capable of identifying distributive trade-offs in the name of 
fairness, that such uses of judicial discretion do not exceed the scope of 
the court’s institutional competence, and that the Court should not retreat 
from this laudable path. To be sure, at times the Court has also misused 
the idea of fairness, reducing it to an empty representational device 
through which facile slogans could unduly displace serious distributive 
analysis.17 Nevertheless, the Court’s occasional embrace of the principle 
in substantive terms deserves attention and praise. In the midst of sobering 
reflections on law’s complicity in perpetuating Europe’s inequalities, it 
may be important to take stock of narrow, but clear, progress through 
law.18 
As a result of fairness-driven holdings in Luxembourg, state legislators 
have already faced considerable pressure to control aggressive debt 
collection practices in austerity-ridden countries.19 Progress results as well 
from the inter-institutional dialogue increasingly triggered by the 
supranational regulation of private autonomy.20 The transmission belt that 
connects the Troika’s recipes for growth to the member state governments’ 
austerity reforms is notoriously rigid and leaves little room for textured 
accounts of its social consequences. It is in the context of contract law 
adjudication that, by contrast, such accounts find a stage. The post-crisis 
anecdotes of private misery that are found in the litigation of contract 
disputes acquire not just visibility, but also legal, justiciable form. Shoring 
up such hard-won expressive outlets in the face of countervailing 
messages is essential.  
The argument proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the CJEU’s 
‘discovery’ of fairness as a general principle of civil law in the path 
breaking case E Friz.21 Section 3 equates the general principle of fairness 
with distribution-sensitive adjudication, and illustrates how the CJEU’s 
balancing of conflicting interests in its preliminary rulings could be 
regularly informed by lucid forms of distributive analysis. Section 4 posits 
that, given the conceptual and systemic autonomy of civil law principles, 
judicial fairness can radiate meaning beyond the confines of B2C disputes 
and onto broader inequality debates without any undue blurring of 
canonical partitions (private/constitutional, legal/political).  
                                                          
17 See Section 7.  
18 See U Mattei and F Nicola, ‘A “Social Dimension” in European Private Law? The Call 
for Setting a Progressive Agenda’ (2006) 41 New England Law Review 1. 
19 See Section 4. 
20 ibid. 
21 Case-215/08 E Friz GmbH v. von der Heyden [2010] E.C.R. I–2947, ¶ 48. 
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By way of comparison, Section 5 identifies several functional equivalents 
of the general principle of fairness in U.S. contracts adjudication and 
recounts their rise and fall. Section 6 shows how the decline of judicial 
fairness has led U.S. progressive jurists to pursue the goal of fairer 
transactions outside of court, and points to the downsides of excising 
fairness from contracts adjudication. On the basis of this assessment, 
Section 7 affirms the usefulness of a judicial principle of fairness in 
supranational private law, but it cautions the CJEU against resorting to 
false or facile dichotomies in the balancing exercise that fairness requires.  
The essay concludes by joining an emerging strand in current legal 
scholarship. This strand remains critical of the shortcomings of the EU 
legal architecture from the perspective of distributive justice, and yet 
clings to law – as both process and substance – whenever law can 
effectively fence off two ongoing phenomena: the deployment of 
economic dogma as a conversation stopper in policy-making circles, 
discussed in Section 8, and  the endless proliferation of ‘unweighted’ 
narratives in EU discourse, which are too often balanced against one 
another as if they all had equal importance and legitimacy (Section 9).  
 
2. Discovering Fairness 
In recent years, the CJEU has worked on the assumption that a general 
principle of fairness must guide the adjudication of disputes between 
private parties. In E Friz, a path-breaking case decided at the dawn of this 
decade, the Court held that it is “in accordance with the general principles 
of civil law [to ensure] a satisfactory balance and a fair division of the 
risks among the various interested parties.”22 The CJEU did so while 
interpreting a text that, contrary to the directives on Unfair Contract Terms 
(UCT) and on Unfair Commercial Practices (UCP), did not adopt fairness 
as a central concept and only referred to it obliquely. 23 While arguably in 
line with the ample set of CJEU cases that embrace a thick notion of 
consumer protection,24 this was a judicial move of a different order of 
magnitude. At stake in E Friz was not just the normal practice of providing 
authoritative readings of secondary legislation when the statutory text calls 
for fairness in particular contractual contexts. Rather, identifying fairness 
                                                          
22 ibid (emphasis added). 
23 Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 of the European Economic Community to 
protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises 
(referring only once in its preamble to a 1974 preliminary programme of the European 
Economic Community for a consumer protection and information policy, which asked 
“that appropriate measures be taken to protect consumers against unfair commercial 
practices in respect of doorstep selling.”). 
24 V Trstenjak and E Beysen, ‘European Consumer Protection Law: Curia Semper Dabit 
Remedium?’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 95. 
5 
 
as a result of general principles of civil law meant adopting it as a plausible 
interpretive aid whenever applicable laws do not lend the judge precise 
guidance.  
The facts and the law of the E Friz case have been thoroughly analyzed by 
other scholars, making a full summary here redundant.25 In brief, in 1991 
Mr. von der Heyden had received an unsolicited visit by a tax consultant 
who had convinced him to invest, together with other partners, in the 
modernization of decrepit real estate in Berlin. For contracts concluded in 
this haphazard fashion, the EU door-step selling directive grants 
consumers a right to repent, i.e. to cancel the deal in a period of no less 
than seven days from due notice of this right.26 If the consumer receives 
no such notice – as was the case here – the possibility to cancel lasts 
longer.27 Accordingly, Mr. von der Heyden withdrew from the partnership 
in 2002, after a period of over 10 years, hoping to recoup the full value of 
his investment on restitutionary grounds. The partnership, however, 
refused to refund Mr. von der Heyden, and asked instead that he pay them 
over €13,000 – the negative difference between his original investment 
and his share of the steep losses suffered by the partnership over the years. 
This result would be in compliance with German law, and in particular 
with the judge-made principle of ‘defective partnership,’ duly highlighted 
for the CJEU by AG Trstenjak in her opinion.28 
The language used by the Court to endorse the latter result is worth quoting 
in full: 
48   As the Bundesgerichtshof observed in its decision for reference, 
[the German] rule is intended to ensure, in accordance with the 
general principles of civil law, a satisfactory balance and a fair 
division of the risks among the various interested parties. 
49   Specifically, first, such a rule offers the consumer cancelling his 
membership … the opportunity to recover his holding, while taking 
on a proportion of the risks inherent to any capital investment of the 
type at issue in the main proceedings. Secondly, it also enables the 
other partners or third party creditors … not to have to bear the 
financial consequences of the cancellation of that membership, which 
moreover occurred following the signature of a contract to which they 
were not party.29 
                                                          
25 See MW Hesselink, ‘The General Principles of Civil Law: Their Nature, Roles and 
Legitimacy’ in D Leczykiewicz and S Weatherill (eds),  The Involvement of EU Law in 
Private Law Relationships 131 (Hart Publishing, 2013). 
26 Directive 85/577/EEC (n 23).  
27 Case C-481/99 Heininger v. Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG [2001] E.C.R. I-
09945; Case-412/06 Annelore Hamilton v. Volksbank Filder eG. [2008] E.C.R. I-02383 
(discussing the issue of limitation on the time for repentance).  




The Court’s promotion of fairness to the rank of general principle of civil 
law in the context of E Friz is highly meaningful to the development of 
EU law. The Court decided this case in 2010 – two full years into the 
financial crisis, at a time in which consumers all over Europe and beyond 
shared Mr. von der Heyden’s desire to walk back from improvident 
investments.30 The jurists who wrote the E Friz judgment were surrounded 
by news of pervasive financial disasters, and were constantly reminded 
that the consequences of poor financial market regulation would hit some 
pockets of the EU population much more heavily than others. This was 
fertile terrain for the judicial discovery of a principle of fairness31 – a 
principle that had not been named either by the referring court or by the 
Advocate General, and that was invoked sua sponte by the CJEU. 
Apportioning losses fairly, i.e. protecting those who were hopelessly stuck 
with the partnership from the sudden flight of those who could withdraw 
their membership, seemed to be what justice required. The Court decided 
accordingly.  
To be sure, a narrow reading of the case is also possible: the decision could 
have been merely a pluralist embrace of Germany’s own partnership law, 
developed by German judges on the basis of German principles. Besides, 
according to the door-step selling directive, the restitutionary 
consequences of withdrawal must be determined by national law, and the 
CJEU had little choice but to defer to the German definition of such 
remedies. But the language of the Court goes beyond mere judicial 
necessity. It is a language of solidarity between those who could flee and 
those left behind in the quagmire of financial disaster. It is at least 
plausible that the judges could see the analogy between the uneven 
distribution of losses inside the E Friz partnership on one hand, and 
Europe’s larger inequities on the other: the widening of the spreads, the 
predicament of the PIIGS, and the plight of the unemployed.  
 
3. Fairness as distributive justice 
Another reason why the judgment is momentous is that it embraces a 
substantive – as opposed to procedural or discursive – notion of fairness. 
The interests of all the parties to the E Friz dispute were not just formally 
                                                          
30 AG Trstenjak pointed out that “Investment in [junk] property, which Germans opted for 
primarily on account of the resultant tax benefits, has often failed to deliver the expected 
results, and investors have therefore looked for ways of terminating those investments by 
relying inter alia on the Community directives concerning consumer protection.” E Friz, 
[2010] E.C.R. I–2947, ¶ 3.   
31 K Lenaerts and JA Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and 
General Principles of EU Law’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1629, 1635  
(referring to judicial ‘discovery’ of general principles, which are assumed to pre-exist in 
the legal system of reference). 
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represented in the opinion, but tangibly recognized in the outcome and in 
the way the loss from poor investments was apportioned between affected 
investors. Adopting a fairness principle of this sort signals openness to 
distributive justice in contract law and departs from philosophical or 
utilitarian approaches that reduce contract exclusively to ‘promise’ or 
‘efficiency.’32  
The question whether distributive considerations really belong in private 
law adjudication continues to animate legal scholarship.33 Many object to 
distributive justice as a goal of contract law, either because of adherence 
to the view – based on legal philosophy– that contracts enforcement should 
cling to corrective justice only,34 or because of the conviction that 
distributive justice is more efficiently achieved through taxation and other 
forms of transfers, as opposed to adjudication of private disputes.35 A 
complete refutation of these arguments exceeds the scope of this paper, 
but abundant counter-arguments exist in theoretical literature.36 Foremost 
among such arguments is the finding that, as a matter of positive law, 
redistributive motives are already pervasive in the law of contracts, and 
that many rules and doctrines cannot be understood without resorting to 
substantive fairness.37 Fairness competes with other values for primacy, 
but it is obviously in the race.  
Fairness is regularly balanced against other values in the system, while 
also nesting within itself an evaluation of relative costs and benefits. In a 
Rawlsian sense, fairness requires aiding “the least advantaged,”38 which in 
contract law means minimizing the negative impact of rules on those who 
would lose the most due to background unfairness. Whenever an 
interpretive gap leaves the judge room for maneuver, a lucid assessment 
of circumstances and distributive considerations must precede and guide 
the adjudicatory process. Flattening the fairness mandate onto a context-
indifferent plane, as if all consumers and traders deserved invariant 
amounts of autonomy and protection, would not promote substantive 
                                                          
32 See A Bagchi, ‘Distributive Justice and Contract’ in G Klass and others (eds),  
Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 193 (Oxford University Press, 2015)  
(providing a persuasive account of reasons to adjudicate contract disputes in light of 
distributive justice, and a full survey of relevant literature).      
33 Fennell and McAdams ‘The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics’. 
34 EJ Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press, 1995). 
35 L Kaplow and S Shavell, ‘Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax 
in Redistributing Income’ (1994) 23 Journal Legal Studies 667. cf Fennell and McAdams, 
‘The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics’ (providing a thorough critique of the 
assumption that taxation is always a preferable strategy for wealth redistribution). 
36 Bagchi (n 32). 
37 D Kennedy, ‘Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special 
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power’ (1982) Maryland Law 
Review 563. 
38 J Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’ (1985) 14 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 223. 
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justice.39 A contextualized and distribution-sensitive reading of the 
fairness principle in court is a necessary (though not sufficient) antidote to 
the ongoing re-formalization of private law – a process in which, for the 
sake of the internal market, the EU legal system creates new average 
groups and reinterprets justice as market access.40   
A paradigmatic example of judicial balancing, based on thoughtful 
distributive considerations, is to be found in Justice Brennan’s opinion in 
Penn Central v. New York.41 Following denial of a permit to build above 
the existing station’s structure, appellants sought monetary compensation 
based on the idea that zoning regulation (in particular, the preservation of 
historic landmarks) had resulted in the taking of their jus aedificandi. 
Famously, Brennan noted that the City’s preservation of historic 
landmarks over time was the very reason for the enormous value of Penn 
Central’s property. In the balancing of property rights against public 
interest, it became therefore clear that appellants derived great advantage 
from the very regulatory practice that they deemed harmful, and deserved, 
as a consequence, no compensation.42 
The mode of judicial reasoning adopted in Penn Central may strike some 
European observers as excessively open-ended, but it is hard to see how 
the dispute could be seriously resolved without resort to Brennan’s 
distributive logic.  A lucid consideration of benefits and harms is not 
beyond the realm of judicial functions, but is rather essential to an 
intelligent adjudication of each case. A distributive analysis of the type 
performed in E Friz in application of the door-step selling directive 
confirms the plausibility of a distribution-sensitive application of fairness 
in judgment. The consideration of the situational predicaments of all 
creditors affected by Mr. von der Heyden’s withdrawal added to the clarity 
of the judgment, allowed for context-tailored application of pro-consumer 
legislation, and avoided one-sided results that might go against the intent 
of the EU legislator. 
                                                          
39 Kukovec (n 6). 
40 Bartl, ‘Internal Market Rationality, Private Law and the Direction of the Union: 
Resuscitating the Market as the Object of the Political’ (n 8) 586 (explaining that EU 
private law, in the name of the Internal Market, has “creat[ed] new average groups and 
[stressed] procedural rights rather than substantive protection[,]” thereby eclipsing 
substantive justice). 
41Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).    
42 ibid 147 (“Even where the government prohibits a noninjurious use, the Court has ruled 
that a taking does not take place if the prohibition applies over a broad cross section of land 
and thereby “secure[s] an average reciprocity of advantage.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S., at 415, 43 S.Ct. at 160…. It is for this reason that zoning does not 
constitute a “taking.” While zoning at times reduces individual property values, the burden 
is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to conclude that on the whole an individual 




4. The Expressive Function of Judicial Fairness 
As noted, the elevation of fairness to the status of substantive principle in 
the case law of the CJEU has possibly far-reaching implications for the 
EU legal discourse. In the realm of EU-level consumer disputes, fairness 
parlance has naturally blended with issues of social justice and economic 
recovery and with the constitutional protection of fundamental rights. 
Thematically and structurally, such connections are crucial.43 The 
regulation of private autonomy at the EU level – the very podium on which 
fairness has been promoted to the rank of general principle – is an 
important part of serious reflections on equality, and on the lack of it.44 
Recent contributions to the literature on inequality in the Western world 
have shed light on the fact that returns on capital (Piketty) or on real 
property (Stiglitz) have been much higher in modern times than economic 
growth. Such spectacular returns have created an ever deeper chasm 
between rich and poor, with dire consequences for republican ideals and 
for democracy itself. A necessary complement to such macro-economic 
vehicles of inequality is to be found in contract law, which to this day 
rewards higher bargaining power, enables larger-than-growth returns for 
“the haves,”45 and exerts a constant upward pressure on the Gini 
coefficient. “Fairness” is code for all the ways in which such dynamics 
might be controlled at law, and is therefore an inherent part of 
contemporary equality discourse in law, politics, and beyond. 
The emergence of general principles of law in the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU has raised questions of federalism and institutional competence.46 
Scholars have debated whether contract law in particular is sufficiently 
harmonized at the EU level as to express truly common principles and, if 
so, whether it is proper for the CJEU – as opposed to legislatures or other 
                                                          
43 See, eg, HW Micklitz and I Domurath (eds), Consumer Debt and Social Exclusion in 
Europe (Ashgate, 2015). 
44 JE Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future 
(W.W. Norton & Company, 2013); T Piketty, Capital in The 21th Century (Belknap Press, 
2014). 
45 M Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change’ (1974) 9 Law and Society Review 1. 
46 See, eg, S. Weatherill, ‘The “Principles of Civil Law” as a Basis for Interpreting the 
Legislative Acquis’ (2010) 6 European Review of Continental Law 74; AS Hartkamp, ‘The 
General Principles of EU Law and Private Law’, (2011) 75 RabelsZ 241; Hesselink, ‘The 
General Principles of Civil Law: Their Nature, Roles and Legitimacy’; N Reich, General 
Principles of EU Civil Law (2014).   
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epistemic communities47 – to name and define them.48 Others have ably 
tackled this larger debate. 49 It may therefore suffice here to note that, at 
least with regard to the principle of fairness in private law, such concerns 
seem unfounded. In line with acquired interpretive principles of civil law, 
general principles are judicial tools but need not be judicial creations, and 
have historically coexisted with utterly formalist conceptions of 
adjudication. 50  As elements of closure, they must be derived by induction 
from positive legal norms. Fairness is by now fully reflected in many 
corners of the consumer legislative acquis and is definitely ready for 
judicial consumption. Invoking fairness as a general principle of (EU) civil 
law is no sign of impermissible activism. 51 
E Friz attests to the possibility of discursive osmosis across the 
private/public divide in a way that does not disrupt the relative autonomy 
of private law. The type of fairness embraced by the E Friz Court speaks 
to broader, systemic issues of the EU legal order, but it does not ignore the 
distinction between principles of civil law and higher-order principles of 
European constitutional law.52 It only allows the practice of private law 
adjudication to radiate meaning and to perform a constitutionally 
appropriate expressive function.  
Put simply, the embrace of a particular rhetorical mode in the adjudication 
of contract disputes may amplify the relevance of certain concerns and 
enhance their weight beyond the courts, well into the political arena. In 
better words,    
The politics of contract technicality […] is an ideological and 
rhetorical, rather than a directly distributive politics. In discussing 
                                                          
47 Such as the bodies responsible for the development of the PECL or the DCFR. See 
Hesselink, ‘The General Principles of Civil Law: Their Nature, Roles and Legitimacy’ 167 
and 175. 
48 See M Claes, ‘The European Union, its Member States and their Citizens’ in D 
Leczykiewicz and S Weatherill (eds), The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law 
Relationships 29. 
49 See J Basedow, ‘The Court of Justice and Private Law: Vacillations, General Principles 
and the Architecture of the European Judiciary’ (2010) 18 European Review of Private 
Law 443, 456; Guido Alpa, ‘General Principles of Law’ (1994) Annual Survey of 
International and Comparative Law. 
50 The Italian experience with general principles during and after fascism attests to the 
compatibility between general principles in private law adjudication and formalist 
understandings of legal interpretation. See Alpa (n 49); S Vogenauer, ‘‘General Principles’ 
of Contract Law’ in L Gullifer and S Vogenauer (eds), English and European Perspectives 
on Contract and Commercial Law: Essays in Honour of Hugh Beale 291, 293-299 (Hart 
Publishing, 2014); E Hondius, ‘Principles and the Law’ (2012) 20 European Review of 
Private Law 289, 291 (“The Italian Codice Civile of 1942 is the only modern Civil Code 
to use principles explicitly.”). 
51 H-W Micklitz, ‘Mohamed Aziz - Sympathetic and Activist, but did the Court Get it 
Wrong?’ in A Sodersten and JHH Weiler (eds), Where the Court Gets it Wrong (2013).  
52 See M Dougan, ‘The Impact of the General Principles of Union Law upon Private 
Relationships’ in Leczykiewicz and Weatherill (eds), The Involvement of EU Law in 
Private Law Relationships 71 (firmly restating this distinction). 
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technical issues, legal scholars make arguments, and these arguments 
“resonate” with, or are homologous with, or are mutually re-
enforcing vis-à-vis arguments in domains conventionally thought to 
be political rather than merely technical.… If contract law requires 
businessmen of equal bargaining power to look out for one another, 
then it is more plausible that public law should require strong groups 
to look out for weak ones.53 
Recent literature has portrayed the dialogue between Spanish courts and 
the CJEU as a serious challenge to the austerity politics embraced in 
Madrid, both by means of preliminary references and in the context of 
contract disputes.54 This portrait, if correct, illustrates the power of 
principle in private law adjudication. Courts engaged in the discussion of 
substantive fairness are on one hand only solving atomistic contract 
disputes; on the other hand, by striving to promote fairness between 
private parties, their judgments become an important element in their 
natural epistemic landscape. 
The CJEU can perform this important expressive role without invoking 
constitutional precepts or rehashing legislative debates, but simply 
building on the solid jurisprudential tradition of culling principles from 
within private law rules. Fully framed by the legislator through rules of 
private interaction, and then developed organically from within, the 
principles of private law may hold superior legitimacy exactly because of 
their merely indirect reference to the rest of the legal and political order. 55 
Rather than being influenced by ideology, they can safely radiate from the 
inside out.  
A comparison with the U.S. experience, where fairness as a principle or 
policy carries diminishing weight in adjudication and is no longer central 
to judicial culture, seems to recommend exactly this course of judicial 
action. 
 
5. Fairness in U.S. Contract Law: Rise and Fall 
                                                          
53 D Kennedy, ‘The Political Stakes in "Merely Technical" Issues of Contract Law’ (2002) 
10 European Review of Private Law 7. 
54 F Gomez-Pomar and K Lyczkowska, ‘Spanish Courts, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, and Consumer Law’ (2014) 4 InDret (noting an increase in preliminary 
references from Spanish courts concerning  the compatibility of Spanish rules with 
Directive 93/13, and finding that such references  “[change] the strategic interaction 
between the Spanish Government and the courts” with regard to the protection of mortgage 
debtors); FE de la Rosa, ‘The Treatment of Unfair Terms in the Process of Foreclosures in 
Spain: Mortgage Enforcement Proceedings in the Aftermath of the ECJ’s ‘Ruling of the 
Evicted’’ (2015) 2 ZEuP 366. 
55 The doctrine of mistake, for instance, is an old device by which certain jurisdictions have 
since time immemorial provided shelter for the unwary. H Collins, The Law of Contract 
4th edn (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 276. 
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In order to facilitate transatlantic comparison, it is essential to outline and 
debunk canonical distinctions. The idea that courts should be guided, when 
adjudicating private disputes, by meta-principles of justice has a particular 
pedigree in continental Europe – one that is notably lacking in U.S. law. 
Judge-made law is anathema to the civilistes because the system cannot 
have holes and must contain all answers.56 When judges encounter a gap 
or ambiguity in positive law, they need to find guidance in principles that 
are inherent to their legal order, and that manifest themselves as obvious, 
pervasive themes in all expressions of legitimate authority. General 
principles aptly ensure the closure and completeness of the system. This 
assumption of closure is not typical of the common law and is definitely 
not essential in U.S. contract law. Organic growth and adaptability – 
staples of the common law – would be impaired if judges were to find 
solutions exclusively inside the box of written rules and precedents. As a 
matter of course, U.S. contract law does not use the label of general 
principles in the way EU judges do.57  
So much for clichés. In practice, the need to convey objectivity and 
restraint in court is as much a necessity in the United States as it is 
elsewhere.58 The fact that many judicial posts are filled by virtue of 
election or executive appointment makes it especially important for the 
bench to dispel any impression of ideological bent. Decisions informed by 
“public policy” – an acceptable criterion of last resort in U.S. contract 
adjudication59 – demonstrate the extent of this judicial angst: in their 
opinions, judges take pains to list a series of legislative, judicial and 
executive practices that substantiate the particular policy they are 
embracing. Only if the whole legal system seems to be pointing in a given 
                                                          
56 Art. 4 of the Code Civil Napoleon (1804) provides that a judge who refuses to give 
judgment on the pretext that legislation is silent, obscure or insufficient, may be prosecuted 
for denial of justice. The various historical vicissitudes of the several European states have 
added nuance to this basic concept, but have not eliminated it. The reference to general 
principles as mechanisms of closure and gap-filling also derives from the philosophy of 
liberal state codifications in the 19th century – one of complete break with natural law, 
custom, and residual norms of Jus Commune – with the result that no solution of a dispute 
between private parties can find its source beyond the confines of positive codification.     
57 But see, Antonin Scalia, ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’ (1989) University of 
Chicago Law Review 1175 (lamenting the absence of general principles in US 
constitutional adjudication); Edwin Patterson, ‘Cardozo's Philosophy of Law’ (1939) 88 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 71 (“[Benjamin Cardozo’s] search for principles 
of value behind precedents resembles the agelong search for natural law.”). 
58 D Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication [fin de Siècle] (Harvard University Press, 1998) 
1-2. 
59 “In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken of […] the 
strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions[.]” Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 178(3) (1981). See DA Friedman, ‘Bringing Order to Contracts 
against Public Policy’ (2012) 39 Florida State University Law Review  (noting that “public 
policy defenses that specify a violation of a statute or regulation tend to be twice as 
successful than those that appeal broadly to public policy.”). 
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direction can the judge adopt a corresponding policy as guiding criterion.60 
Findings of public policy, just like general principles in Europe, are cast 
in terms of judicial restraint.61 Hennigsen v. Bloomfield – a famous case 
decided at the dawn of the 1960s – provides a clear instance of this 
practice. In its opinion, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that the 
contract signed by the purchaser of a defective automobile might be 
sufficiently conscionable in a technical, doctrinal sense, and yet it was to 
be partly voided – i.e. purged of exculpatory clauses – in light of a general 
trend towards heightened consumer protection and responsible 
manufacturing.62 This trend found ample, ‘objective’ documentation in the 
draft Uniform Commercial Code and New Jersey’s Uniform Sale of Goods 
Act.63 The public policy that enabled judicial voidance of a contract clause 
was ‘discovered’ in the legal system at large, and avowedly not concocted 
in or by the court. In such judgments, it is apparent that public policy in 
U.S. courts is a functional equivalent of the general principle of fairness 
invoked by the CJEU in the E Friz judgment.64 
Further equivalents emerged around the same time.  In the late 1960s, 
following the path-breaking case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas65 and 
against the background of rising pro-consumer activism,66 the idea of 
substantive fairness in contract law adjudication came to be embedded in 
unconscionability analyses. The old equitable remedy grew into a versatile 
tool for policing unfair contract clauses in court, and for a while it allowed 
judges to redress business’ overreach in consumer contracts.67   
In order to achieve substantive fairness through contract adjudication, 
courts would also refer to economic and political phenomena that upset 
the original balance of interests between the parties to a contract. Still into 
the 1990s, a time of welfare contraction in the U.S., it was not uncommon 
                                                          
60 See, eg, Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988); Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
61 See J. Lipshaw, ‘Formalism, Scientism, and the M-Word: A Comment on Professor 
Movsesian's Under-Theorization Thesis’ (2006-2007) 35 Hofstra Law Review 23, 30  
(posing the question, “[w]hy, if we all acknowledge we are now legal realists, and the law 
is the product of social, personal and political influences, do we, as lawyers and judges, 
continue to speak of the law as though it were there to be discovered, à la Langdell or 
Williston, preexisting but untapped, the work of some unnamed Author?”).  
62 See PA Alces, A Theory of Contract Law: Empirical Insights and Moral Psychology 
(Oxford University Press, 2011) 129-33. 
63 Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 386 (speaking of the Uniform Sales Act); ibid 404 (speaking of 
the Uniform Commercial Code). 
64 I use the concept of functionalism in the loosest possible sense, as an enabler of 
comparison. See R Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) 339 (offering an insightful dissection of the concept 
and positing its lasting usefulness).  
65 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
66 President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Protecting Consumer 
Interest (Mar. 15, 1962). 
67 Anne Fleming, ‘The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the ‘Law of the Poor’ (2014) 
102 Georgetown Law Journal 1383. 
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for courts to name growing unemployment, and reduced choice for would-
be employees, as additional reasons to invalidate restrictive terms in 
employment contracts; or to highlight the increased need for child-care 
services, resulting from mothers’ early return to work, as a reason to void 
exculpatory clauses drafted by child-care providers.68  
In contrast to such past trends, the current landscape of contract 
adjudication is much less inclined to embrace any functional equivalent of 
a fairness principle in adjudication.69  Today U.S. courts take little 
advantage of the adjudicatory tools in their arsenal – such as public policy, 
unconscionability, or impracticability – to redress the uneven spread of 
losses in post-crisis markets. Residual efforts of this kind are visible in 
some states more than others.70 More often, judges cling to the formalist 
enforcement of contracts as written.71 Substantive justice can sometimes 
be achieved nonetheless, for example via rules of formation that simply 
leave out of the deal its most unfair clauses.72 But there is general 
agreement, among scholars, that fairness per se carries diminishing 
                                                          
68 D Caruso, ‘Contract Law and Distribution in the Age of Welfare Reform’ (2007) 49 
Arizona Law Review 666.  
69 See S Landrum, ‘Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us About How 
State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements’ (2014) 97 
Marquette Law Review 751; P MacMahon, ‘Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an 
Underenforced Legal Norm’ (2015) 99 Minnesota Law Review 2051. 
70 A quick count of the contract cases that address explicitly the issue of “unfair terms” and 
contractual “fairness” finds West Virginia at the top of the list. The West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals has indeed actively policed unfair contract terms. See Brown ex rel. 
Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 228 W. Va. 646, 724 S.E.2d 250 (2011); Brown v. 
Genesis Healthcare Corp., 229 W. Va. 382, 729 S.E.2d 217 (2012) (Brown II) (concerning 
the validity of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts). This trend has 
met with reproach at the US Supreme Court. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 
132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203-04 (2012) (“West Virginia’s prohibition against predispute 
agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing homes is 
a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is 
contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA”). A similar judicial trend is visible in 
California. See TH Riske, ‘No Exceptions: How the Legitimate Business Justification for 
Unconscionability Only Further Demonstrates California Courts' Disdain for Arbitration 
Agreements’, (2008) 2008 Journal of Dispute Resolution 591. 
71 See GM Cohen, ‘The Financial Crisis and the Forgotten Law of Contracts’ (2012-2013) 
87 Tulane Law Review 1 (critically stating that “[m]ost discussions to date of possible 
responses to the financial crisis ignore contract law. To the extent contract law makes an 
appearance, the assumption is usually that the contracts at issue should and will be strictly 
enforced, so there is not much more to say. Contract law, however, is not dead. Nor is it 
impotent; it has just been forgotten.”). 
72 Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that terms –in 
this case an arbitration clause received with a product –– do not become part of the contract 
unless the non-merchant buyer expressly agrees to them). But see Hill v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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judicial weight.73 The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken with particular 
clarity against voiding ‘unfair’ arbitration clauses in contract disputes. 74 
 
6. Fairness out of court in U.S. Law and Policy 
Aware of the reluctance of many jurisdictions, and of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, to rein in freedom of and from contract, pro-consumer activism has 
largely abandoned court-centered strategies. The task of pursuing fairness 
goals in U.S. contract law has been embraced more directly via legislation 
and executive action. In U.S. academic circles, the aftermath of ‘Lehman 
Brothers’ has been hailed by pro-consumer jurists as “a time of 
momentous and transformational change in the world of consumer law.”75 
The drastic changes have resulted not from a strengthened judicial policy 
of fairness in contract cases, but rather from the spectacular success of pro-
consumer politics in Washington DC. The recent establishment of a new 
federal agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), has 
been noted as a notable shift from the reality of pre-crisis America, 
characterized by little concern for vulnerable market participants and by 
the relative triumph of autonomy in federal adjudication.76  
Interestingly, this shift has downplayed soft principles like fairness and 
has instead emphasized hard numbers.  Establishing the CFPB required 
the political left (championed by Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth 
Warren) to ally with Chicago-trained law & economics scholars so as to 
ground the case for financial regulation on narrow and fully documented 
examples of market failure.77  
Another, more local example of executive mobilization towards fairness 
is to be found in California’s Uber saga. Unfair terms imposed by Uber 
Technologies, Inc. on its drivers could not be successfully challenged in 
                                                          
73 J Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Conservative Campaign to Roll Back the Common Law 
(Beacon Press, 2005) (generally deploring the implosion of fairness in court). cf O Ben-
Shahar, ‘Fixing Unfair Contracts’ (2011) 63 Stanford Law Review 869 (confirming that 
U.S. courts interfere with unfairness very little, but arguing that they do so for good reason). 
74 Rent-A-Car., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 177 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2010); 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 179 L. Ed. 2d 742 (2011); 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 181 L. Ed. 2d 586 (2012); Am. Exp. 
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 186 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2013). 
75 JA Spanogle and others (eds), Consumer Law: Cases and Materials, 4th edn (West 
Academic Publishing, 2013) v (noting the enactment of “ground-breaking federal 
consumer protection legislation … in the wake of the financial crisis.”). 
76 ibid (including the 1991 preface, which describes a desolate landscape: 
unconscionability deflated in court and used more by corporations than individuals, a 
notably inactive FTC, deregulation and federal preemption of state usury laws, and only 
little solace in the Baby FTC Acts, meant to compensate for FTC inaction). 
77 O Bar-Gill and E Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’ (2008) 157 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 3. 
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court,78 but could be affected by the California Labor Commission, which 
in June 2015 held that drivers are employees, not independent contractors, 
and as such find protection in statutory employment law.79     
More generally, an important strand of legal academia, recommends 
turning to consumer activism so as to reverse the business-friendly 
treatment of unfair boilerplate terms where it most matters, i.e. in the 
forum of public opinion.80 Because the idea of judicial fairness has fallen 
to the margins of pro-consumer discourse, fairness battles must be fought 
on broader political grounds. 
Such changes are momentous and need careful evaluation. At a glance, the 
decline of fairness as a principle in U.S. contracts adjudication might not 
seem problematic. After all, a rhetorical emphasis on fairness remains 
compatible with a narrow reading of the concept, leading to the 
enforcement of many contract clauses of questionable distributive 
valence.81 Fairness is obviously a malleable concept.82 In the U.S. 
Congress, fairness arguments have been used, for example, to reduce 
rather than expand the possibility of consumer class actions.83 Most 
worryingly, fairness parlance in court can “increase the appearance 
of…relative justice of the status quo”84 and so prevent the gathering of 
political consensus around the need for reform. 85 It might very well be, 
therefore, that a social justice agenda in U.S. contract law is better served 
by activist engagement with legislative and executive bodies than by 
nostalgic revivals of fairness-based adjudication. Much contract law 
happens anyway outside of the judicial arena, in private fora for dispute 
                                                          
78O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 989 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
79 Berwick vs. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. 11-46739 EK (2015). 
80 “Consumer  activism  in  the  form  of  dissent  and  voice  through Internet and  other 
channels is  the  heart of the  solution.” S Ghosh, ‘Against Contractual Authoritarianism’ 
(2014) 44 Southwestern Law Review 239. See generally Faircontracts.org, 
http://faircontracts.org (Ralph Nader’s project). 
81 “A bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in 
bargaining position, nor even because the inequality results in allocation of risks to the 
weaker party.” Troy Mining Corp. v. Itmann Coal Co., 176 W. Va. 599 (1986) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 234 cmt. d at 111 (10th Draft No. 5, 1970)).  
82“Perhaps the concept of good faith takes on so many different meanings in different 
contexts because at base it is nothing more than a requirement of fairness - a definition so 
broad as to be virtually meaningless.” R Hillman, ‘Policing Contract Modifications under 
the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress’ (1979) 64 Iowa Law Review 
849, 877.   
83 G Calabresi, ‘Class Actions in the U.S. Experience: The Legal Perspective’ in JG 
Backhaus, A Cassone and GB Ramello (eds), The Law and Economics of Class Actions in 
Europe: Lessons from America (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) (discussing the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005). 
84 Kennedy (n 58) 2. 
85 “From the perspective of the law school contracts classroom, it might appear that contract 
law requires people to be fair to one another. But many judge-made rules of contract law 
that purport to give weak parties protections against strong parties turn out to be illusory in 
practice.” ibid 270 (footnote omitted). 
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resolution as well as in a growing number of self-regulating 
communities.86  
There are, however, significant problems with the ongoing shift away from 
judicial fairness. First, in sectors in which there is no legislative will to 
pursue redistributive fixes, the relaxation of fairness as a guiding judicial 
principle leaves weaker parties entirely out in the cold.87 Employment 
contracts in the low-wage sector, for instance, are unlikely to be 
legislatively regulated any time soon, yet are replete with unfair terms that 
could use more judicial policing in many jurisdictions.88 Second, in so far 
as courts remain repositories and propagators of values in the United 
States, the decline of fairness as a guiding principle in contract law 
adjudication is an alarming trend.89 Third, as evidenced by the genesis of 
the CFPB, empiricism in contract law is on the rise. Scholars traditionally 
concerned with fairness towards consumers and with protection of weaker 
parties resort to field experiments more and more often, and they feel 
compelled to support their objections to untrammeled freedom of contract 
with tangible evidence of systemic unfairness.90 The shift is evidentiary: 
the type of empiricism now in vogue assumes that the market is efficient 
and capable of redressing unfair contractual practices through self-healing, 
competitive market mechanisms. Only when the opposite is proven, not 
just by a plethora of anecdotes, and not even by bold examples of 
contractual overreach,91 but by extensive field work,92 can regulation be 
tolerated at the margins. In this climate, resorting to “considerations of 
                                                          
86 F Cafaggi, ‘Self-regulation in European Contract Law’ (2007) 1 European Journal of 
Legal Studies 1. 
87 R Arnow-Richman, ‘Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form 
Employment Agreements’ (2007) 49 Arizona Law Review 637. 
88 See, generally V Moffat, ‘Making Non-Competes Unenforceable’ (2012) 54 Arizona 
Law Review 939. Professor Rachel Arnow-Richman deems it unlikely that a bill recently 
introduced in the U.S. Senate (the M.O.V.E. Act) will make it through the legislative 
process in the present political climate. E-mail from Rachel Arnow-Richman, Professor at 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law, to AALS Contracts List Serve (June 6, 2015) 
(on file with author). 
89 J Resnik, ‘Fairness in numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, and Turner v. Roger’ (2011) 125 Harvard Law Review 78 (“Courts in democratic 
social orders are […] one of several venues in which the content of law is debated, and 
other branches of government may, in turn, respond.”); MJ Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine 
Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (Princeton University Press, 2014). 
90 See, eg, I Ayres and A Schwartz, ‘The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law’ 
(2014) 66 Stanford Law Review 545. 
91 J Resnick, ‘Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in 
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights’ (2015) 124 Yale Law Journal 2804 (2015) (“We  may  
change  any  terms,  conditions,  rates,  fees,  expenses,  or  charges  regarding your Services 
at any time.” — Wireless Provider “Customer Agreement.”). 
92 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, ‘Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Finds 
that Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers’ (Aug. 1, 2015),  
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_factsheet_arbitration-study.pdf (finding that 
few consumers obtain individual relief through arbitration and the courts; therefore, 
arbitration agreements limiting class actions greatly diminish the possibility for relief.).  
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equity and fairness”93 in contract law adjudication comes to sound 
somewhat old-fashioned, and so does the idea of capturing the economic 
reality of contracts by focusing exclusively on what happens in court. The 
residual cohort of scholars involved in promoting considerations of 
fairness in U.S. courts’ adjudication finds a formidable obstacle in the new 
empiricist trend.94 The ALI reporters recently tasked with drafting a 
Restatement of Consumer Law are dedicated empiricists,95 who have often 
used economic arguments to prove the irrelevance of existing regulation,96 
and have been trained in the conviction that pursuing equitable 
redistribution via judicial fairness is passé.97 In this climate, fairness 
projects are likely to remain isolated phenomena, rather than part and 
parcel of contract law.  
 
7. Towards a Fair Division of Risks in Post-Crisis EU Adjudication 
If compared to the tough stance of the U.S. federal judiciary towards the 
ongoing plight of American consumers, the attitude of the CJEU in matters 
of contractual fairness looks remarkably emotive and empathetic.98 The 
CJEU has been guided by a series of statutory provisions (secondary 
legislation), some clearly aimed at regulating contracts through private law 
rules (in primis the UCT directive), others designed to prompt 
administrative control (such as the UCP directive) but no less helpful 
towards defining what counts as fair between two parties. Its judgments 
have grown increasingly sensitive to the drama of financial markets’ 
collapse and of austerity measures. In Aziz, in particular, the Court began 
to show real concern for the irreversible, traumatic loss of one’s dwelling 
in the course of swift execution procedures, in a legal landscape that left 
little room for suspension orders and at a time of sudden decline in the 
value of mortgaged property.99 Importantly, Aziz also prompted legislative 
                                                          
93 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890–91 (1921). In this case, considerations 
of fairness famously led Judge Cardozo to interpret an express condition so as to avoid the 
‘unjust’ forfeiture of a significant sum of money. Forfeiture would have resulted from a 
formalist reading of the contract. A recent survey of doctrinal possibilities aimed to redress 
the practice of unfair terms in standardized contracts is to be found in N Kim, Wrap 
Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
94 Radin (n 89); Arnow-Richman (n 87). 
95 O Ben-Shahar, F Marotta-Wurgler & O Bar-Gill (Reporters), ‘Restatement (Third) of 
Consumer Contracts’, American Law Institute, (last accessed Nov. 2, 2015), 
www.ali.org/projects/show/consumer-contracts/. 
96 See, eg, O Ben-Shahar & C E. Schneider, More than You Wanted to Know: The Failure 
of Mandated Disclosure (Princeton University Press, 2014). 
97 S Shavell and L Kaplow, Fairness versus Welfare (Harvard University Press, 2006).  
98 Micklitz (n 51).  
99 Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz v. Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya [2013] ¶ [61]. See also 
Case C-169/14 Sánchez Morcillo & Abril García v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 
[2014] EU:C:2014:1388, Order of the President of the Court of 5 June 2014 ¶ [11]; Case 
C-34/13 Kušionová v. SMART Capital [2014] ¶ [63] (“The loss of a family home is not 
only such as to seriously undermine consumer rights[,] but it also places the family of the 
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reform in Spain aimed at enhancing the protection of debtors in the real 
estate market.100 The general principle most used to do justice to 
consumers turns out to be the EU law principle of effectiveness used as 
guidance in interpreting the UCT directive, not the civil law principle of 
fairness invoked in E Friz. However, boosting the effectiveness of fairness 
control via general principles is arguably the same as reinforcing the 
principle of fairness itself.  
The UCT directive has come to life with a force and prominence that 
would have been hard to anticipate when it was adopted.101 The resulting 
case law has been amply praised as a fountain of social justice in times of 
drought, to the point of prompting parallels between today’s CJEU and the 
Warren Court102 – a remarkable makeover for a court charged with 
Lochnerism in other contexts.103 This line of judgments has also led 
several scholars to fear back-lash effects,104 to question the propriety of 
the Court’s foray into political ground,105 or at least to argue that the Court 
went as far as it could.106  Oliver Gerstenberg, in particular, has carefully 
recounted the many institutional constraints within which the Court must 
operate when interpreting the UCT directive for the benefit of national 
courts. First, the CJEU cannot trespass horizontal boundaries, i.e. it cannot 
usurp the role of the EU legislator. Second, the CJEU must limit itself to 
the task of interpretation, as opposed to applying the law to the facts; 
applying the law to the facts is a task reserved to the national courts, 
especially when the text of reference is one of minimum harmonization. 
Third, the CJEU must respect the internal integrity of member states’ 
private laws, and therefore, must not turn all private law disputes into 
constitutional questions. Fourth, the CJEU must avoid engaging directly 
with the politics of solidarity, both because it is only a court and because 
                                                          
consumer concerned in a particularly vulnerable position[.]”). Note that, while in Aziz the 
Court and AG Kokott avoided direct references to housing as a socio-economic right, such 
references are quite explicit in the more recent cases. 
100 The Spanish reform has already been itself the object of scrutiny in Luxembourg. See 
C-482, 484, 485 and 487/13. 
101 N Reich and H-W Micklitz, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty: The Revival of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive (UCTD)’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 771. 
102 Micklitz (n 51). 
103 D Nicol, ‘Europe’s “Lochner” Moment’ (2011) 2011 Public Law 308; Christian 
Joerges, ‘Justice within and between Polities’ Verfassungsblog, (June 10, 2015); D Caruso, 
‘Lochner in Europe: A Comment on Keith Whittington’s “Congress Before the Lochner 
Court”’ (2005) 85 Boston University Law Review 867.  
104 Micklitz (n 51).  Backlash effects are already visible. See Kušionová, [2014] Case C-
34/13; Case C-482/12 Macinský v. Getfin SRO Financreal SRO [2013] (AG opinion). See 
F Della Negra, ‘The Uncertain Development of the Case Law on Consumer Protection in 
Mortgage Enforcement Proceedings: Sánchez Morcillo and Kušionová’ (2015) 52 
Common Market Law Review 1009, 1031 (concluding that with Kušionová the Court went 
too far back from Aziz). 
105 Micklitz (n 51). 
106 Gerstenberg (n 10) 614-620. 
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the EU as a system is not endowed with necessary competences in matters 
of welfare.107  
Yet, it can be argued that the Court is not taking full advantage of the space 
allowed for by the legislative acquis of consumer protection.108 Recent 
judgments and opinions indicate a less than full embrace of the private law 
principle of fairness in Luxembourg. This hesitation is uncalled for. There 
is ample support, in the regulation of private autonomy stemming from EU 
legislation, for a general principle of fairness in EU private law. The basic 
idea that weaker parties should not be hoodwinked, that their inaction 
should not be exploited, and that every time there is room for interpretation 
the judge should lean in a direction that prevents the enrichment of parties 
with higher bargaining power, is an idea firmly built in the architecture of 
EU private law. This solid base should lend ample credibility to fairness 
as a principle with teeth.  
The mandate of fairness in consumer transactions took explicit legislative 
form exactly because of the realization that freedom of contract, which to 
this day is the backbone of the internal market, leads normally to 
imbalanced terms in B2C standard forms, and needs regulatory control 
precisely towards the goal of enabling true autonomous choices for both 
sides – traders and consumers.109 Yet the Court seems eager to remind 
itself and others that fairness control remains an exception, to be 
interpreted with care and restraint. This seems to be the case especially in 
the context of AG opinions, which is where deep judicial rationales can 
surface.110 It is as if Aziz brought the Court to the edge of the judicial cliff, 
causing panic and retreat. For instance, even in a remarkably pro-
consumer opinion, substantially followed by the Court in Kásler, AG 
Wahl took pains to drop an uncalled-for reminder that freedom of contract 
is paramount: 
104. While fully aware that this question was not referred directly and 
specifically to the Court, and that it has not, therefore, been discussed 
by the parties[,] I think that it is important to stress that […] the 
purpose of the court’s intervention must, as far as possible, be simply 
to reestablish a degree of equality between the sellers or suppliers and 
the consumers with whom they conclude contracts[.] 105. It must not 
lead to the upsetting of the contractual balance through the 
intervention by a State authority after the contract has been 
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concluded. […A]ny intervention by a third party, including the State 
in its legislative function, must be viewed with caution in so far as it 
could potentially jeopardise the freedom of contract and the free 
competition which are its corollary.111 
Consider, another passage, intended by AG Wahl to premise his discussion 
of mortgaged property repossession in Slovakia (Macinský):  
60.   As the global financial crisis from which Europe and the rest of 
the world is slowly recovering shows, a well-functioning and healthy 
credit system is one of the cornerstones of an open market economy. 
This may lead legislatures to devise particular security and 
enforcement schemes which are more or less favourable to the 
business sector in order to support the credit system. The case under 
consideration raises the question as to whether the procedure at issue 
goes too far in favouring traders over consumers.112  
These are worrisome quotes. Framing the analysis in these terms is not in 
line with the spirit of the UCT directive, its focus on weakness and 
vulnerability, and its function as a bulwark against the predictably 
inequitable effects of sheer market forces. The point is not that 
vulnerabilities among traders should be disregarded – indeed, the practice 
of distributive analysis requires consideration of such issues in context.113 
But it is hard to see what a healthy credit system has to do with cut-throat 
debt collection practices. There is general consensus across ideological 
camps that the global financial crisis resulted not from the suppression of 
private autonomy, but rather by excessively permissive regimes. 
Monitoring the overreach of business is not a hindrance, but rather a 
condition towards achieving a healthy credit system. The balancing 
opportunity provided by the fairness test is, in the AG opinion, distorted 
by vulgarized versions of laissez-faire economics. The weighing is flawed, 
and the distributive stakes are therefore deeply misrepresented.      
The AG had of course plausible reasons to deem the reference in this case 
inadmissible (the debtors’ claim, once meritorious, was arguably moot by 
the time the reference reached Luxembourg), but he would also have had 
ample opportunity to empathize, if not with the defaulting debtors, at least 
with the referring court. Instead, the referring court was left wondering 
whether anything in EU law might point to the injustice of Slovakia’s 
execution proceedings.114 The AG chose to chide the Slovak court for its 
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lack of clarity, knowledge, and organization – a choice of tone presumably 
meant to stem the inflow of references in Luxembourg – and to explain 
that efficient debt collection is essential to the economic recovery of 
Europe.  
Even bracketing these expressions as dicta and focusing only on instances 
of empathetic engagement with post-crisis predicaments, it remains 
unclear whether the contract law emerging in Luxembourg is fully 
responsive to a principle of fairness – even within an area where the EU 
legislator has asked the CJEU to set a floor of minimum substantive 
fairness across the Union. Gerstenberg’s analysis shows that, in a 
deliberative, procedural sense, the Court’s case law has adequately served 
the function of representing multiple interests, prompting detailed 
justifications of outcomes, and learning from a plurality of national 
experiences. This is, admittedly, one version of fairness. But recall the core 
question asked by the Spanish court in Aziz: “[H]ow is disproportion to be 
interpreted?”115 Answering this question implies distributive 
considerations of the type famously embraced by Justice Brennan in Penn 
Central. Consumer-trader relations can look very different in the various 
corners of the Union.116 In its preliminary rulings, the CJEU should guide 
national judges to unpack the distributive complexities of each dispute, 
rather than resorting to empty juxtapositions.   
 
8. Law and the Dominance of Economic Dogma 
The foregoing pages have built upon the assumption that the CJEU has 
correctly ‘discovered’ a general principle of fairness in the relatively self-
contained realm of national private laws and in light of supranational 
enactments. On this basis, the previous sections have concluded that 
context-sensitive fairness towards consumers is a welcome proposition, 
fully ripe for judicial enforcement. Two corollaries accompany this 
conclusion. First, in speaking against crass abuses of consumers’ 
vulnerabilities, as it did in Aziz and could have done in Macinský, the 
CJEU duly embraces the idea that fairness and autonomy are fully 
intertwined.117 The private law notion that emerges from fairness-driven 
adjudication is distinctively thick, articulate, and irreducible.118 Second, 
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the fact that a strikingly thin notion of autonomy continues to surface in 
judicial opinions goes against the grain of specific legislative choices and 
against positive law in the nation states. Such representations of 
‘disembedded’ autonomy in judicial discourse should not be condoned or 
praised as expressions of values in deliberative processes and balancing 
exercises, especially when they may lead to justify aggressive debt-
collection and repossession practices. 
The resilience of out-of-context references to naked autonomy is a 
disquieting phenomenon that deserves elaboration.119 The EU’s 
intervention in contract law has brought about an enormous expansion of 
private autonomy, both across borders (via the judicial activation of the 
four freedoms) and inside domestic markets (via the reduction of state 
control over a plethora of services and economic activities);120 on the other 
hand, and precisely towards the goal of increasing the volume of 
transactions, the EU’s legislator has enacted new common rules.121 Due to 
curious optical distortions, especially in the wake of recent financial 
market reforms, EU-level regulation makes a larger impression than 
autonomy-boosting interventions. As a result, with an ironic flip of 
Scharpf’s asymmetry paradigm,122 domestic systems come to be 
romanticized as cradles of autonomy, while the supranational level is 
identified with regulatory constraint.123 The truth, of course, is otherwise. 
If contractual autonomy in national private law was ever free of regulatory 
laches, such halcyon days were certainly over before the inception of the 
internal market project.124 Autonomy has long been welded to other 
systemic goals in national systems. In the wake of the 1985 White Paper, 
many private law scholars considered the harmonization of private law a 
carrier of regulatory dilution – not expansion – and mobilized to contain 
the regressive distributive effects of such developments.125 Fairness won 
its role of general principle by killing a dragon or two in the EU political 
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and legal arena, and should not be knocked out of place by callous 
references to tabloid economics.  
This essay’s insistence on B2C fairness as positive law with a spine, if not 
with teeth, is in line with a growing trend towards asserting ‘hard law’ in 
private disputes and in other facets of post-crisis Europe. Champions of 
this trend include scholars with ample training in legal realism, fully 
conscious of law’s pliable nature and definitely uneasy with doctrinal 
rigidity. The new emphasis on the rule of law as a bulwark of civility in 
these scholars’ writings is intended to protest the superimposition of an 
economic paradigm of necessity over legal frameworks of welfare, 
constitutional arrangements and international obligations. Following 
CJEU and German FCC judgments upholding legal measures aimed at 
saving the Euro, scholars have tackled the functionalist relaxation of 
interpretive canons and lamented the subjugation of law to economic 
dogma.126 Along the same lines, others have denounced the sheer illegality 
of measures brought about by austerity politics and decried, for instance, 
the many unchallenged breaches of human rights caused by the Troika-
driven policies of Greek austerity.127 
  
These critiques resonate loudly in the context of this essay. AG Wahl’s 
reminder that a “healthy credit system is one of the cornerstones of an open 
market economy” relies, worryingly, on the rhetorical appeal of economic 
necessity: the paramount health of the credit system is invoked to rein in 
the reach of fairness – a principle of law – in the context of aggressive 
lending practices. Against such judicial stances, and in line with the just 
described scholarly trend, this essay has attempted to highlight fairness as 
the firm line that it should be in accordance with the explicit mandate of 
secondary EU legislation.128 In myriad ways, the private law of the EU has 
been and should be subject to critique, both internal, as it is riddled with 
contradictions, and external, given its predetermined agenda,129 its uneven 
impact on different regions of Europe,130 and its overly narrow focus.131 
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9. Fairness and the Perils of Deliberation 
 
This essay partakes of a post-crisis movement, led by a growing circle of 
scholars, which clings to law as a bulwark against the rhetoric of economic 
necessity. But it also calls into question another worrisome feature of EU 
law, namely the mind-boggling multiplication of ‘non-weighted’ 
narratives in EU discourse, which come to be balanced as if they all held 
equal importance. In the context of the Eurozone crisis, the tale of virtuous 
Swabian wives, only spending what is already in the pot, has been artfully 
juxtaposed to alarming reports of southern tragedy, with the rhetorical 
effect of leveling the two perspectives as if they had an equal claim to 
distributive justice and as if the difference principle had never entered the 
universe of political concepts.132  The private law quest for fair results in 
contracts disputes risks being derailed by similar juxtapositions: evicted 
consumers on one hand, and a credit system in need of efficiency on the 
other. The fact that in the weighing of such conflicting needs the EU 
legislator has been placing emphasis on the protection of situationally 
weaker parties risks getting lost in the balancing game.  
The excessive use of such flat juxtapositions may be attributed to two 
trends. First, proportionality has fully entered the realm of private-law 
adjudication – a practice by now amply analyzed in the literature;133 
second, a heartfelt belief in the power of judicial deliberation has gained 
currency in private law circles. With specific regard to the reading of the 
UCT directive in Luxembourg, Gerstenberg portrays the Court as laudably 
engaged in the desirable processes of perfecting, through dialogue with 
national courts, the meaning of fairness in contract disputes:  
[The Court’s] experimentalism envisages a circular—recursive and 
mutually transformative—relationship between general interpretive 
frameworks and their contextualising application: national courts 
apply the ‘general criteria’ to a particular term in the circumstances 
of a case, but through their references to the CJEU for preliminary 
rulings also, where appropriate, invite revision of those general 
criteria in the light of their consequences. Harmonisation occurs … 
through always provisional and rolling endorsements, ultimately by 
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the citizens themselves, of emergent paradigm instances of improper 
contractual terms. 134 
This passage clearly echoes the vast body of literature that falls under the 
headings of conflicts law, justification, and proceduralization.135 
Developed over the course of the past two decades on the basis of 
authoritative philosophical foundations, this body of scholarship posits 
that the added value of EU law lies in its procedural coordination of 
conflicting views. EU law provides a system that will tolerate and even 
foster pluralism in so far as dissonant voices are able to produce 
justifications for their arguments. When applied to the realm of private 
law, this view has led to the idea that the Court could continue the process 
of harmonization beyond the point of legislative consensus. The Court 
may develop organically, by means of examples, the meaning of 
intrinsically complex principles such as fairness. In this view, the very 
design of the CJEU may fuel this process. Because the CJEU contains 
legal actors from different legal traditions, it inherently forms an 
agglomerate of divergent worldviews.136 The variety of understandings of 
fairness brought to the bench by such different actors as AGs Trstenjak, 
Kokott, and Wahl is apt to yield precisely this type of organic accrual.  
It is worth noting, however, that hints of perplexity have emerged from 
within this school of thought. Christian Joerges, after sobering reflections 
on law in a time of crisis, has more recently conceded that the range of 
justifications allowed for by the Court is narrow and may actually shut 
down important voices and values.137 To this type of worry one should 
add, in light of Macinský, the fear that under the guise of pluralism the 
Court might facilitate the unraveling of hard rules and the unmaking of 
clear legislative progress. Through Macinský, it is easy to see how the 
formula of value pluralism can become a victim of its own success, 
rehashing balancing acts that should have been confined to the legislative 
arena, and drowning substantive fairness in a sea of justifications. 
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